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Abstract:  The working paper contains an extended review essay of Zdenĕk Kühn, The Judiciary 
in Central and Eastern Europe: Mechanical Jurisprudence in Transformation? (2011). The central thesis 
of the book is that ‘there is a deep continuity in the methods of legal reasoning employed by 
lawyers in the region, starting in the era of Stalinist Communism, continuing through the era of 
late Communism of the 1970s and 1980s and up to the current post-communist period’. In 
this respect the book’s analysis is retrospective, starting in the late nineteenth century, when 
the Central European legal culture emerged within the ‘Austrian legal tradition’. It provides a 
rich analysis of legal thinking, institutional practices, and expert as well as public discourse 
concerning judges, courts, and judicial process over the course of the whole of the twentieth 
century in the region. The book’s central argument concerns our time, however. The 
continuity of Central European legal thinking is, according to Kühn, ‘manifested in the 
problems of the first two decades after the collapse of Communism’. In this regard the book 
turns to the present and future of Central Europe and becomes missionary, offering a 
diagnosis together with a prescription. The cure lies, essentially, in catching up with the West 
and adopting its ‘new European legal culture’. More concretely, Kühn argues empathically for 
the empowerment of the judiciary, which would in his view correspond to the development in 
the West throughout the second half of the last century.  
The result is rather ambiguous. On the one hand, the book is engaging and worth reading 
for anyone interested in post-communist Europe and its past. The book however serves as an 
interesting exhibit in the gallery of post-communist legal culture, rather than an accomplished 
study thereof. In what follows I will firstly introduce the book and then turn to its problematic 
features, which relate to the (still) prevailing discourse concerning post-communism in Europe.  
 
                                                     
* Assistant Professor in EU law, European Institute and Department of Law, London School of 
Economics and Political Science, J.Komarek@lse.ac.uk. This paper is a book review of Zdenĕk Kühn, 
The Judiciary in Central and Eastern Europe: Mechanical Jurisprudence in Transformation? (Leiden: Martinus Nijhof 
2011). 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The central thesis of Zdenĕk Kühn’s book is that ‘there is a deep continuity in the 
methods of legal reasoning employed by lawyers in the region, starting in the era 
of Stalinist Communism, continuing through the era of late Communism of the 
1970s and 1980s and up to the current post-communist period’ (p. xv). In this 
respect the book’s analysis is retrospective, starting in the late nineteenth century, 
when the Central European legal culture emerged within the ‘Austrian legal 
tradition’.1 It provides a rich analysis of legal thinking, institutional practices, and 
expert as well as public discourse concerning judges, courts and judicial process 
over the course of the whole of the twentieth century in the region. The book’s 
central argument concerns our time, however. The continuity of Central European 
legal thinking is, according to Kühn, ‘manifested in the problems of the first two 
decades after the collapse of Communism’ (p. xv, emphasis added). In this regard 
the book turns to the present and future of Central Europe and becomes 
missionary, offering a diagnosis together with a prescription. The cure lies, 
essentially, in catching up with the West and adopting its ‘new European legal 
culture’. More concretely, Kühn argues empathically for the empowerment of the 
judiciary, which would in his view correspond to the development in the West 
throughout the second half of the last century.  
The result is rather ambiguous. On the one hand, the book is engaging and 
worth reading for anyone interested in post-communist Europe and its past. The 
book however serves as an interesting exhibit in the gallery of post-communist 
legal culture, rather than an accomplished study thereof. In what follows I will 
firstly introduce the book and then turn to its problematic features, which relate to 
the (still) prevailing discourse concerning post-communism in Europe.  
 
 
 
THE BOOK 
THE ORIGINS OF CENTRAL EUROPEAN LEGAL CULTURE  
 
The book starts with a relatively short presentation of the Central European legal 
culture. It dates back to the early nineteenth century Habsburg Empire, which 
‘developed a complex system of bureaucracy, an independent judiciary, and above 
all, a highly sophisticated legal culture’ (pp. 1-2), exemplified by large codifications: 
firstly the General Civil Code (1811) and later procedural codes (1873 and 1895). 
                                                     
1 Kühn does not seem to distinguish clearly between the categories of legal tradition, legal family or legal 
culture used in comparative law; in this review, I keep the terms used by Kühn in quotations, whereas in 
my own text I refer to the continental European tradition on the one hand and the Anglo-American 
tradition on the other. On the genealogy of such classifications and their ideological importance see 
Mariana Pargendler, ‘The Rise and Decline of Legal Families’ (2012) 60 American Journal of Comparative Law 
1043-1074.  
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Kühn contends that ‘[t]he successor states of the Empire inherited from the 
bureaucratic Habsburg State deep confidence in written law: they believed, and 
thus sometimes entertained over optimistic expectations, that statutory law could 
regulate social relations and transform the society through social engineering’ (p. 
4).  
The chapter then turns to institutional issues, focusing on the position of 
judges, mostly in Czechoslovakia in the inter-war period. Kühn notes their 
declining status (particularly as regards their salary, but also concerning the scant 
respect paid to them by the other branches of government). Kühn nevertheless 
finds, rather optimistically, that ‘[T]he judges honored their independence and 
understood it as a necessary condition of their activity. When democracy hit a 
crisis point in Central European in the late 1930s, judges across the region, in 
sharp contrast to their German counterparts, were one of its most devoted 
advocates’ (pp. 13-14).  
The chapter concludes with a short consideration of the experience of World 
War Two. The author ‘believe[s] that the intellectual influence of the [Fascist 
totalitarian ideology] was unimportant’ (p. 17), which was in his view due to the 
Nazi closure of universities in Poland and the occupied Czech lands. Moreover, 
‘with the exception of racial and political matters, judges were dealing with the 
same issues which they had dealt with for decades’ (p. 17). Kühn observes that it 
‘is remarkable that the liberal conception of law and judicial power was able to 
survive at least to some extent under [the] oppressive regime’ (p. 18). This 
optimism is tamed at the very end of the chapter, however: ‘the Central European 
nations, ravaged by a brutal war and with it elites decimated, became a much easier 
target for the incursion of a new political and legal system, Stalinist socialism’ (p. 
20).  
 
 
 
SOCIALIST LEGAL CULTURE IN CENTRAL EUROPE  
 
In the second chapter the author firstly explains the success of Stalinization of the 
pre-war legal culture, which he ascribes to ‘the communist dominance of the legal 
academia and the attack on the intellectual independence of the law faculties’ (p. 
22), together with ‘frequent visits by Soviet experts’ (p. 23) and the ‘isolation from 
the western legal thought’ (p. 23).  
Political trials of the 1950s are discussed only briefly, but Kühn emphasizes 
the ‘serious consequences [...] on the minds and consciences of lawyers 
participating in them’ and mentions that ‘[t]he stigma of the trials caused general 
distrust toward judges among a wide public’ (p. 27).2 A brief overview of the 
period from the 1960s to the 1980s is then provided, before Kühn discusses the 
                                                     
2 For this contention Kühn, however, refers to an academic work published in Hungary in 1987 and the 
report of the Dubček [the leader of the reformist fraction in the Czechoslovak Communist Party in 1968] 
Commission of inquiry – one may therefore ask to what extent the contention is substantiated.  
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overall transformation of the legal system, which aimed at creating law 
‘comprehensible to all’, in line with the communist ideology. The main reforms 
concerned the adoption of new civil codes, the inclusion of laymen in the legal 
system, the restriction of the competence of ordinary courts and the increasing 
role of administrative decrees, which contributed to the sense that Central Europe 
was ‘leaving the continental tradition’ (p. 40), illustrated also by the introduction of 
the institution of prosecutor – ‘the main guardian of socialist legality’ (pp. 43- 45).3 
At the same time, law disappeared from many areas of life, if measured by the 
number of cases brought to courts, and lawyers continued to lose their prestige. 
Judicial independence was never fully restored, especially since judges were elected 
for a relatively short term (in Czechoslovakia) and because of the overall influence 
of the Communist Party. 
The chapter closes with a short reflection on the very existence of a separate 
socialist legal culture. Kühn seems to agree with those comparatists who doubted 
it. For example, the ‘socialist’ civil codes had been introduced into Central 
European legal systems ‘through the indirect route of Soviet law transplants, 
themselves inspired by the German law of the early twentieth century’ (p. 63). The 
key difference, however, consisted in the ideology underlying the culture. Taking 
cues from John Hazard’s work on socialist law,4 Kühn notes:  
 
Socialist law was to serve solely the interest of the Party, which was the only 
competent authority capable of leading its nation towards the objective of the 
very existence of the socialist society – a classless community of 
Communism. Socialist law in this sense might perhaps be closer to the family 
of religious legal systems, as the element of holy writ (the role of classical 
writings of Marxism-Leninism in legal reasoning), typical for religious legal 
cultures, might be spotted in the socialist legal culture (p. 64). 
 
 
 
JUDICIAL IDEOLOGY IN COMMUNIST TIMES  
 
The third chapter forms the central part of the book, occupying almost a third of 
its overall content. It narrows down the broad picture drawn in previous chapters 
and deals with judicial methodology or, as Kühn calls it using Jerzy Wróblewski’s 
theoretical framework, the ideology of judicial application of law, or simply judicial 
                                                     
3 In my view, to translate the term ‘prokuratura’ as ‘prosecutor’ is misleading, precisely because the 
prokuratura had a much wider function than just prosecution. On this notion see e.g. Jonathan D 
Greenberg, ‘The Kremlin’s Eye: The 21st Century Prokuratura in the Russian Authoritarian Tradition’ 
(2009) 45 Stanford Journal of International Law 1.  
4 John N Hazard, Communists and Their Law (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press 1969).  
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ideology.5 This ideology ‘determines and prescribes the proper method of the 
judicial interpretation of the law; as well as the ideal role a judge should have in 
society’ (p. 67). Kühn (following Wróblewski) distinguishes three ideologies: the 
ideology of bound judicial decision-making, which ‘maintains that, in their work, 
judges are fully bound by general rules, which in turn fully control their 
adjudication’ (p. 68). On the opposite side, there is the ideology of free judicial 
decision-making, which puts ‘emphasis on outcomes consistent with some values 
prevalent in the system (political ideology, religion, the idea of justice, 
effectiveness etc.), while adherence to general rules is of secondary importance’ (p. 
68). The ideology of legal and rational judicial decision-making then occupies a 
compromise position between the two.  
Kühn further introduces into his analysis the distinction between formalism 
and anti-formalism, taking into account both aspects of the style of judicial 
reasoning and the surrounding environment of the judicial process. First, 
formalism refers to ‘methodological formalism, which reflects the philosophy of 
textual positivism’ (p. 75). ‘Textual positivism’, another conceptual category used 
by Kühn, consists, ‘in its most extreme form [...] [of]  nothing more than the 
textual exegesis of law’ (p. 69). Methodological formalism ‘presupposes that – in 
their reasoning – judges employ arguments of the plain meaning of a statutory text 
and present their analysis as a sort of inevitable logical deduction from this text’ (p. 
75). Secondly, ‘formalist reasoning is viewed as a purely mechanical mental 
operation’ (p. 76).  
This conceptual apparatus is then put into a wider context, where Kühn 
argues that in the course of the twentieth century, western law was gradually 
abandoning formalism and the ideology of bound judicial decision-making, which 
(according to Kühn) governed in the preceding era (which is placed in the 
nineteenth century). ‘The new European legal culture’,6 in Kühn’s view, rejects 
clear dichotomies (between binding and non-binding arguments or valid/invalid 
law). At the same time, this new culture distinguishes between ‘hard and easy 
cases, although it is admitted that the dividing line between these two categories is 
vague and blurred’ (p. 84).  
The main bulk of the chapter consists of the analysis of the ideology of 
adjudication in socialist times. Kühn divides the 40 years of communist rule in 
Central Europe into two stages. First, the 1950s, where the judge is presented as ‘a 
builder of communism’, and second, the period starting some time in the 1960s, 
where the ‘new socialist textual positivism’ started to reign. The first, activist era 
was based on the Soviet idea of law, which was founded on a seeming paradox: 
‘On the one hand, facing the atmosphere of the building of Socialism, the judicial 
application of law was clearly activist and anti-formalist. On the other hand, the 
Stalinist theory of law developed clear textualist, positivist, and formalist features’ 
(p. 94). The paradox is explained, according to Kühn, by the fact that judicial 
                                                     
5 Jerzy Wróblewski (Zenon Bankowski transl and ed), The Judicial Application of Law (Dordrecht: Kluwer 
1992).  
6 Here Kühn refers to Martijn W Hesselink, The New European Legal Culture (Deventer: Kluwer 2001).  
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activism corresponded to the total mobilization and transformation of society, 
while formalism and positivism conformed to the Stalinist desire to control the 
whole of society from the centre – although it clearly contradicted the Marxist 
thesis about a gradual withering away of the state. This paradox (or contradiction) 
was solved in a peculiar way: the faithful adherents to Marx were either executed 
or disappeared (p. 93). Kühn analyses the gradual transformation of judicial 
rhetoric in Central Europe, which explicitly employed Marxist ideology. This 
included references to the works of the classics, Marx and Engels and sometimes 
quotations from speeches by domestic or Soviet communist leaders. Judges 
‘educated’ defendants, while they openly identified socialist law with morality. At 
the same time they used law instrumentally, especially when they had to apply rules 
adopted before the communist takeover. The second era of socialist law saw the 
opposite trend: the retreat from activism. Although ‘the official self-perception of 
communist judges’ continued to be ‘strongly anti-formalist, as evidenced by 
frequent reports, directives and statements of the supreme courts’ (p. 120), the 
practice was different, as Kühn demonstrates in a number of examples from 
Czechoslovak courts. In line with judges, academics started to develop ‘the 
concept of limited law’, which supported judicial formalism.  
The concept of limited law is another important category borrowed by Kühn 
from general jurisprudence for the purposes of his analysis.7 Kühn looks at legal 
education and legal scholarship and observes the lack of interest in theories of 
interpretation. Kühn also looks at the way socialist academics saw western law: in 
his view, they ‘posited a simplified ideal of the western continental legal tradition’. 
Socialist scholars ‘[held] onto the ideas of the Continental Law from the 
nineteenth century and missed the subsequent development of legal thought 
which took place over a substantial part of the twentieth century’ (p. 138). 
Legislative optimism dominated, as also shown by the ever changing laws (rather 
than stable codes), whereas case law’s role was minimal.  
In the rest of the chapter, Kühn addresses the debate on the relationship 
between judicial methodology and injustice committed through courts and 
attempts to explain the shift from anti-formalism to formalism. In line with the 
scholarship that dealt with other authoritarian regimes, Kühn contends that ‘both 
positivism and anti-formalism might contribute to unjust results’ (p. 146).8  
Kühn explains the move from anti-formalism to its opposite by a number of 
factors. First, referring to Damaška’s distinction between two conceptions of 
judicial authority, coordinate and hierarchical,9 ‘[i]t is plausible to argue that the 
                                                     
7 See p. 71, fn. 24, where Kühn acknowledges that he ‘borrowed the term from, and ha[d] been inspired 
by’ David Lyons, ‘Justification and Judicial Responsibility’ (1984) 72 California Law Review 178.  
8 See particularly Vivian Grosswald Curran, ‘Fear of Formalism: Indications from the Fascist Period in 
France and Germany of Judicial Methodology’s Impact on Substantive Law’ (2002) 35 Cornell International 
Law Journal 101.  
9 See Mirjan R Damaška, The Faces of Justice and State Authority; A Comparative Approach to the Legal Process 
(New Haven and London: Yale University Press 1986), 16-46.  
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judiciary of the early communist times was based on the shared ideals of an 
omniscient Marxism-Leninism, knowledge of which was alone believed to 
generate the only right answer, superior to the formalistic answers produced by 
‘bourgeois’ civil proceedings’ (p. 153). The turn to formalism could then result 
from communist judges’ ‘disenchantment with Marxism-Leninism’ (p. 154). 
Second, ‘most legislation was already enacted by the socialist state, so that there 
was no reason for socialist judges to attempt to rewrite these socialist laws’ (p. 
155). Third, in Kühn’s view, ‘[o]ne should not forget that post-Stalinist formalism 
was also reaction to the Stalinist misuse of law’ (p. 156), which relates to the 
fourth point, the reaction of the general public, that ‘accustomed to the legalism of 
the former bourgeois era, [was] shocked by the extent of anti-formalism exhibited 
by the Stalinist judiciary’ (p. 157). Fifth, the Stalinist ‘emphasis on [legislative] 
norms and state coercion’ (p. 158) favoured formalism and the ideology of bound 
judicial decision-making, rather than activism. Sixth, the ‘strictly literal positivist 
reasoning might in fact function as a protective shield against the charge of 
deviating from the party line’ (p. 158).  
The chapter’s conclusion highlights the backwardness of socialist law: ‘It 
appears that Marxism-Leninism generated a significant time lag in the intellectual 
development of Central and Eastern Europe which could not be overcome within 
the first post-communist decade’ (p. 160). This is shown by socialist scholars’ 
attachment to the ideas of continental European tradition, which had for long 
been outdated and swept away by the ‘new European legal culture’.10 
 
 
 
AFTER THE COLLAPSE 
 
The final two chapters deal with the period after the collapse of Communism until 
the accession of the Central European countries to the EU. Chapter 4 briefly 
describes the challenges facing judges in these countries, mostly in institutional 
terms. Chapter 5 then analyses the period of transformation and forms a 
counterpart to chapter 3, both in depth and the scope of its analysis, occupying 
similarly more than a third of the whole book.  
Chapter 4 looks at the position of the judiciary after 1989: the extent to which 
the personnel could be replaced. There, Kühn finds that ‘already in the beginning 
of the twenty-first century the number of judges who had served on the bench 
before 1989 is low’ (p. 165), which, however, due to the continuity of the ‘type of 
judicial thinking’ did not mean that his analysis of socialist judges was not relevant 
for our understanding of the present condition of the Central European judiciary 
(p. 166). At the same time, while the ordinary judges remain professional career 
ones, coming to the bench soon after graduation and having relatively lower 
prestige (p. 170), a completely new type of actor enters the scene: constitutional 
                                                     
10 See particularly pp. 138-141 and 159-161.  
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justices at newly established constitutional courts. There, in Kühn’s view, ‘we can 
find outstanding figures able to give the Court’s reasoning appropriate direction 
toward sophisticated western style adjudication’ (p. 175).  
Their importance comes to light in chapter 5, a significant part of which is 
devoted to the intercourse11 between the Czech Constitutional Court and ordinary 
courts and the challenge the former has presented to the ideology of bound 
judicial decision-making. Kühn claims that ‘the old philosophies of the bound 
application of law and textual positivism continue to govern the post-communist 
legal and judicial discourse and that, in some ways, their features have even 
worsened’ (pp. 189-190). Kühn concentrates on a number of issues indicating the 
persistence of the old socialist judicial ideology. 
Firstly, in Kühn’s view, ‘[o]ne of the major problems which post-communist 
ordinary courts have faced is the inability to grasp the complexity of hard cases [p. 
201]. The judges ‘implicitly follow the presumption that it is possible to decide any 
case in a textual fashion. [They] try to follow the letter of the law, however 
problematic and absurd the results this course produces (p. 201). They are not 
assisted by legal scholars, who remain imprisoned in the ‘old fashioned positivistic 
doctrine, which [in Kühn’s view] is nicely captured in David Lyons’ term, the 
theory of limited law, or Roscoe Pound’s, “mechanical jurisprudence” (p. 208).12  
This is demonstrated by the continuing scepticism concerning teleological 
reasoning (p. 200), the ‘[i]nability to engage in creative judicial decision-making’ (p. 
207), the lack of ‘legal education in, and notions of, creative interpretation’ (p. 
208). Post-communist judges also hesitate to ‘apply general clauses of the codes or 
general principles of law’ (p. 209). They fail to understand the notion of 
‘persuasive sources’, whereby ‘[i]n a simplified intellectual world of limited law, 
everything is either binding (therefore legally relevant) or non-binding (and, 
therefore, legally irrelevant)’ (p. 210). Kühn also notes the absence of any 
meaningful discourse between the judiciary and academia (pp. 212-215) and finally 
turns to the problem of precedent.  
Here, on the one hand, the continuing denying of the binding force of 
precedent ‘would not, in itself, be tragic because such a view is not uncommon 
even in western Europe’ (p. 217), but ‘[b]ecause any persuasive sources of law are 
beyond the ken of many socialist scholars and judges, precedent is rather 
weightless’ (p. 218). On the other hand, Kühn notes the continuing existence of 
‘[j]udicial interpretational statements, specific instrument of judicial law-making 
par excellence developed in Central Europe during the communist era, [that] are 
issued by supreme courts on a certain legal issue in order to unify the conflicting 
case law’ (p. 218). The importance of the Czech Constitutional Court is 
emphasized again, since it ‘perform[ed] the function which should have been, 
                                                     
11 Kühn calls it a ‘discourse’. Due to the one-sidedness I suggest ‘intercourse’ is a more appropriate 
characterization.  
12 Referring to Lyons, n 7, and Roscoe Pound, ‘Mechanical Jurisprudence’ (1908) 8 Columbia Law Review 
605.  
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under normal conditions, exercised above all by legal scholars’ (p. 200). This is 
documented by numerous examples of the Constitutional Court’s decisions, 
addressing all the problems identified by Kühn.  
Some of the methodological questions became a topic of public discourse in 
the Czech Republic, as is illustrated by the debates surrounding the nominations 
of some constitutional justices, where President Havel intervened on the Senate 
and condemned ‘the conception of law prevailing in the post-communist period’ 
(p. 227). Attention is also paid to the question of the binding force of 
constitutional courts’ precedents, which relates to the problem of what Kühn sees 
as an ‘over-centralization’ of centralized constitutional review’: the insistence of 
constitutional courts on their monopoly on controlling the constitutionality of 
other legal norms, which runs against the ‘philosophy of new constitutionalism’. 
After an extensive discussion of the Czech and Polish constitutional courts’ 
conflicts with ordinary supreme jurisdictions, Kühn concludes that preserving the 
centralized model is still preferable, due to the self-understanding of ordinary 
judges as civil servants, their educational background and, finally, the lack of a 
formal doctrine of stare decisis (pp. 260-263).  
Kühn briefly touches on the issue of the use of comparative law (‘an 
extremely important component of [constitutional courts’] judicial politics – p. 
264) in order to conclude this chapter with an overview of how Central European 
judges (will) cope with European law. It includes both the period before accession 
and shortly after it (given the fact that the book was finished in 2006). He analyses 
the first decisions of constitutional courts (a prominent place is given to an 
analysis of the decisions of the Czech and Polish constitutional courts concerning 
the European Arrest Warrant), then turns his attention to ordinary courts. Here he 
is not at all optimistic: ‘[u]nless Central European legal and judicial methodology, 
which approaches the ideal of mechanical jurisprudence, is radically modified and 
made more open to teleological argumentation, the application of Community law 
might face serious obstacles from lawyers unable to reason about the law’s 
rationale and purpose’ (p. 281).  
In the concluding chapter Kühn comes back to the question whether a 
specific Central European, formerly socialist, now perhaps post-communist, legal 
culture exists. He observes that ‘when lawyers and academics from post-
communist countries meet, they always find that, regardless of which country they 
come from, they are all beset by a common set of problems’ (p. 293). Most of 
these problems, in Kühn’s view ‘relate to the excessive formalism of post-
communist law and to the specific type of authoritarian legal culture based on 
many old-fashioned, Continental legal myths’ (p. 293). ‘The empowerment of the 
judiciary via the European Enlargement might be considered a sort of treatment 
for many [such] problems’ (p. 294), which will require ‘a new ideological 
conception of the judicial function’ (p. 294). Although he acknowledges the 
importance of the proper level of judicial self-restraint (p. 295), Kühn concludes 
his book with a quotation from Tocqueville: ‘as long as the process of 
judicialization is generally considered “one of the most powerful barriers that has 
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ever been devised against the tyranny of political assemblies”, the judicialization of 
politics is likely to continue’ (p. 296).13 
 
 
 
THE MISERY OF CATCHING UP WITH THE WEST 
 
Central Europe is facing a populist or even authoritarian backlash, which is 
following the period of ‘democracy fatigue’ that enveloped the region when it 
joined the EU.14 Simplistic accounts would ascribe this phenomenon to the 
backwardness of post-communist countries, which were still looking back to 
nineteenth century nation-building rather than to twenty-first century transnational 
integration, the destination of Europe’s West.15 According to this ‘backwardness 
thesis’, the present problems, particularly the disenchantment with democracy, the 
high level of corruption and the weak rule of law, are the surviving symptoms of 
post-communist Europe’s past and will be overcome once the region finally 
catches up with the West.  
A different consciousness emerges in post-communist Europe however: that 
its 1989 revolutions were somehow taken away from the people of post-
communist Europe who never got control over their lives.16 Liberal democracy 
coupled with market economy was presented to them as the only alternative, since 
‘third ways’, trying to find a compromise between socialism and capitalism, would 
have led to the third world, as the chief architect of the Czech transformation, 
Václav Klaus, once quipped.17 More critical accounts of the post-1989 period thus 
show how the collapse of communism helped to cement the dominant political-
economic order of the last twenty years, which now goes under the name of 
neoliberalism – and has become contested in the last few years.18 
If we accept the latter narrative, rather than that of post-communist Europe’s 
backwardness, the present ‘populist backlash’ can be seen as a reaction to the 
suppression of many social conflicts, which were contained in the name of the 
                                                     
13 Quoting Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America. Book I (New York: Vintage Books 1945 [1835]), 
107.  
14 See e.g. special issue of (2007) 18 Journal of Democracy, Number 4.  
15 See Ralf Dahrendorf, Reflections on the Revolution in Europe (New Brunswick and London: Transaction 
Publishers 2005 [ĉ]), 149-150 (Dahrendorf himself did not fully endorse the claim).  
16 For a forceful statement see Boris Buden, Zone des Übergangs: Vom Ende des Postkommunismus (Frankfurt 
am Main: Suhrkamp 2009).  
17 ‘Third Way, No Way?’, Notes for the World Economic Forum, Davos, 26 January 2000, referring to 
Klaus’ 1990 Davos speech, available at http://www.klaus.cz/clanky/1186, last accessed on 31 January 
2014. 
18 See particularly Johanna Bockman, Markets in the Name of Socialism: The Left-Wing Origins of Neoliberalism 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press 2011). The term ‘neoliberalism’ is now used in ideological battles 
much like ‘communism’ used to be, and it is notoriously difficult to define neoliberalism today; see e.g. 
Philip Mirowski, ‘Postface: Defining Neoliberalism’ in Philip Mirowski and Dieter Plehwethe (eds), The 
Road From Mont Pèlerin: The Making of the Neoliberal Thought Collective (Cambridge, Mass and London: 
Harvard University Press 2009), 417-455. 
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Return to Europe. To really understand the present problems of post-communist 
Europe requires more open engagement with their communist past, which rejects 
the simple triumphalism of the early post-1989 period. The book under review 
does not offer such an analysis; sometimes its findings are based on rather weak 
evidence. The book also presents the West as the unquestionable destiny of the 
post-communist countries and, finally, it seeks to condemn the period of 
communism and the people involved in it, rather than to understand them. In 
what remains I discuss these shortcomings in detail.  
 
 
 
THE PERILS OF ‘GOING BEYOND TEXTS’  
 
While one may agree with Kühn that ‘the methodological issues [cannot] be 
explained by analyzing the texts of judicial decisions and works of legal theory 
alone’ (p. xviii), the book is weakest precisely where it transcends these textual 
sources. This problem concerns all periods under examination, although to a 
different extent and with different effects.  
When Kühn rather boldly praises Central European judges’ attachment to the 
ideals of judicial independence and democracy, the only evidence concerning 
Czechoslovakia (or its Czech part) comes from Kühn’s reading of the 
Czechoslovak judicial journal, which was ‘firm in its rejection of totalitarianism’ (p. 
14, fn. 63). In my view, one cannot come to such conclusion based on the kind of 
evidence Kühn brings in: a report from a conference of the professional 
organization of Czech judges published in their professional journal, which took 
place several months after the occupation, or a single decision of the Czech 
Constitutional Court from the same period (p. 18).19 In fact, a serious study of 
how the Nazi occupation (and the existence of an independent Slovak state, which 
was in fact satellite to Hitler’s Germany) affected legal culture in Czechoslovakia 
(or more widely, Central Europe) is still missing.  
More problematically, the book glosses too quickly over a troubling period 
between the end of the Nazi occupation in May 1945 and the communist take-
over in February 1948, when a relatively autonomous Czechoslovak government 
contributed no less than communists supported from the Soviet Union to the 
decline of democracy and the rule of law.20 In particular, the post-war retribution 
against ‘Nazi collaborators’ left a deep mark on Czechoslovak legal and political 
culture, with its manifest violations of due process rights, especially the right to 
fair trial, right to defence and judicial independence – viewed even by then post-
war standards.  
                                                     
19 The book which Kühn refers to and which purports to be a ‘historical study’ uses the same ‘evidence’. 
See Pavel Maršálek, Protektorát Čechy a Morava [Protectorate Bohemia and Moravia] (Prague: Karolinum 2002).  
20 For a general account of that period see Benjamin Frommer, National Cleansing: Retribution against Nazi 
Collaborators in Postwar Czechoslovakia (Cambridge: CUP 2005), chapter 1.  
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For the socialist period Kühn selects decisions published in the Czechoslovak 
official reporter of judicial decisions, which replaced various forms of semi-private 
reports existing before the war. This official reporter ‘covered only a small portion 
of judicial decisions, including only those carefully scrutinized by the editorial 
body of the reporter, later also in co-operation with the ministries and law schools’ 
(p. 128). In the light of this, however, it is difficult to portray convincingly the 
mentality of the whole judiciary and its transformation, as Kühn does in the 
‘empirical’ section of chapter 3. Moreover, Kühn himself mentions the critique by 
communist ideologues of decisions of ordinary courts, which naturally did not get 
into the official reporter (p. 104). The question then arises, what was really going 
on in the Czechoslovak judiciary of the time: Stalinization, or an opposition to it 
by the professional judges who were allowed to stay on the bench even after the 
communist take-over of power? And if both (as seems to be the case), what was 
the proportion between the two?  
The ‘empirics’ is even more problematic when generalizations are made from 
few decisions, coming from different countries. At one place Kühn for example 
states that ‘[t]he opinions of many courts [were] full of Marxist slogans’, while 
referring to one decision of the Polish Supreme Court (p. 103) and an example 
from a regional court from Czechoslovakia. How representative are these and how 
was the selection made?  
In the chapter concerning post-communist transformation, the ‘selection bias’ 
is different, but no less problematic: Kühn looks at the Czech Constitutional 
Court’s decisions reviewing ordinary courts, which in many instances would be the 
decisions of the Supreme Court only,21 since judicial remedies must be exhausted 
before a constitutional complaint can be lodged. This can hardly give a realistic 
picture of what was really going on in the judiciary as a whole, since only a handful 
of decisions of all courts in the Czech Republic ever get to the Constitutional 
Court. The harsh critique of the state of legal culture in the Czech Republic then 
can seem rather problematic, especially when it is extended to other countries in 
the region.  
The method of selecting material to support a more conceptual analysis in all 
periods thus seems to be governed by the desire to come to a conclusion which 
was established earlier. It can be too demanding, perhaps, to ask the author to 
concentrate on one country and study the archives containing thousands of 
decisions (as a serious study of a legal culture and its history requires), but it would 
be fair to acknowledge the limitations of the approach ultimately adopted more 
openly and moderate the categorical, if not directly condemnatory, language which 
                                                     
21 The Czech Supreme Administrative Court started to operate only in 2003.  
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pervades the book.22 This applies even more to Kühn’s treatment of ‘Western 
Law’ and its use as a normative ideal for post-communist legal reform. 
  
 
 
THE WEST AS THE PROMISED LAND   
 
In Kühn’s view, the socialist legal culture had adopted ‘a simplified ideal of the 
Western Continental legal tradition’ (p. 138), which then remained in the minds of 
most judges and scholars after the collapse of their communist regimes (chapter 5, 
passim). Incidentally, this ‘outdated’ or ‘old-fashioned’ view corresponds to how 
the continental European legal tradition is sometimes described in Anglophone 
works. Judges are thus denied the power to make law in whatever sense; they are 
entirely subordinated to the legislature and statutes; and they do not know how to 
deal with precedent (they do not have a proper ‘case law method’).23 The French 
in particular are the favourite targets of such (mis-)characterizations, as evidenced 
by Mitchel Lasser’s Judicial Deliberations (used extensively by Kühn),24 but Germans 
did not escape similar mischaracterizations either.25 The ‘new European legal 
culture’ comes to the rescue, however, calling for a ‘creative approach to judicial 
law-making’ (p. 79), provoked by the growth of state powers and the regulatory 
state.26  
One can indeed be puzzled why this version of the history of continental 
European law still survives, in the light of the already existing studies which show 
quite the opposite, as regards both the place of judges and judicial law making27 
and the broader conceptions of law28 in the nineteenth and the early twentieth 
                                                     
22 See for the same kind of hesitations the review of Ingo Müller (Deborah L Schneider transl), Hitler’s 
Justice: The Courts of the Third Reich (Cambridge: Harvard University Press 1991) by Richard Posner, 
‘Courting Evil’ The New Republic 17 June 1991, pp. 36-42, particularly at 40. 
23 For a critique of such derogatory views see Jan Komárek, ‘Reasoning with Previous Decisions: Beyond 
the Doctrine of Precedent’ (2013) 61 American Journal of Comparative Law 149.  
24 Mitchel De S.-O.-L’E Lasser, Judicial Deliberations. A Comparative Analysis of Judicial Transparency and 
Legitimacy (New York: OUP  2004). See my review article, ‘Questioning Judicial Deliberations’, (2009) 29 
Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 805.  
25 Here the main ‘culprit’ seems to be an otherwise admirable book by Franz Wieacker (Tony Weir 
transl), A History of Private Law in Europe with Particular Reference to Germany (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1995), 
also extensively used by Kühn.  
26 See text to n 6.  
27 Kühn notes that his ‘explanation presents a danger of inevitable simplification and even a caricature’ (p. 
78, fn. 58) and refers to Regina Ogorek, Richterkönig oder Subsumtionsautomat?: Zur Justiztheorie im 19. 
Jahrhundert (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann 1986), but his whole account does not seem to 
have taken this book seriously. The book’s main findings were summarized by Regina Ogorek thus: ‘the 
logical‐mechanical view of judicial activity as the part of legal doctrine which was concerned with the 
rules of statutory interpretation could possibly be traced back as a marginal phenomenon at the beginning 
of the [nineteenth] century, and in any event as a late product of the codification movement’, Regina 
Ogorek, ‘Inconsistencies and Consistencies in 19th Century Legal Theory’ (2011) 12 German Law Journal 
34, 56. For an account concerning the French judiciary, see e.g. Jacques Krynen, L’État de justice, France 
XIIIe-XXe siècle. Tome 2 : L’emprise contemporaine des juges (Paris: Gallimard 2012).  
28 See particularly Kaarlo Tuori, Ratio and Voluntas: The Tension between Reason and Will in Law (Farnham: 
Ashgate 2011), with numerous references to works that seem to accord better justice to ‘conceptualists’ 
or ‘formalists’ of the nineteenth century.  
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centuries. One explanation can be that these caricatures are quite effectively 
employed to delegitimize views resembling those which long ago were rejected in 
the progress of history. Nobody would want to look ‘old-fashioned’ or ‘outdated’. 
These are characterizations often ascribed to the contemporary actors of post-
1989 transformation and their views; they were sceptical of the extensive law 
making power of judges, the ideas of ‘New Constitutionalism’ (another brand on 
offer from the West) and the belief that ‘rational’ judicial decision making is less 
arbitrary than ‘formalist’ or ‘positivist’ one, rejected by ‘progressivists’.  
Here we can find interesting parallels to a similar phenomenon known from 
other legal systems: American legal realists’ mischaracterizations of ‘formalists’29 or 
the invention of the term ‘Begriffjurisprudenz’ (‘conceptual jurisprudence’) by ‘its’ 
critics such as Rudolf von Jehring.30 The use of Pound’s term ‘mechanical 
jurisprudence’ is quite indicative of Kühn’s reformist agenda.31 There is in fact 
little serious interest in the actual intellectual world of lawyers during communism. 
Instead, derogatory labels, such as the ‘simplified intellectual world of limited law’ 
(p. 210) are used.  
This can be nicely illustrated by Kühn’s treatment of one of the central 
themes of his criticism of both socialist and post-communist law: the problem of 
precedent and judicial law making. At one place the author criticizes the 
continuing practice of ‘judicial interpretational statements’, ‘issued by supreme 
courts on a specific legal issue in order to unify the conflicting case law’, which are 
said to be ‘unknown in western legal cultures’ (p. 218). Although they are not 
formally binding today, ‘they naturally possess a high degree of persuasive force 
throughout the judicial system’ (p. 218).32 They ‘are decided in abstracto, upon the 
motion of the Court, minister of justice or similar authority, when these bodies 
opine that the interest of uniform case law so demands’ (p. 218). According to 
Kühn, ‘western judges react to this post-communist institution with a mixture of 
surprise and embarrassment, because they view it as in conflict with their ideal that 
the judiciary makes law only through deciding cases, “interstitially,” as Justice 
Holmes once famously noted, not through making law in abstracto’ (p. 219).  
With all respect to ‘western judges’,33 I seriously doubt, that the ‘western 
ideal’ of judicial law making corresponds to Holmes’ celebration of case-by-case 
                                                     
29 See Brian Tamanaha, Beyond the Formalist-Realist Divide: The Role of Politics in Judging (Princeton and 
Oxford: Princeton University Press 2010).  
30 Hans-Peter Haferkamp, Georg Friedrich Puchta und die “Begriffsjurisprudenz” (Franfurt am Main: Vittorio 
Klostermann 2004), 26 actually ascribes the authorship of the term to Jehring. On the German critique of 
Begriffjurisprudenz see Tuori, n 28, 114-117.  
31 On Pound in this context see Tamanaha, n 29, 27-43.  
32 One may wonder what kind of ‘persuasive force’ Kühn has in mind, if he insists that post-communist 
law does not distinguish between anything but binding/non-binding.  
33 They were in fact judges from Germany participating in a twinning project in the Czech Republic. 
Kühn refers to their unpublished report, ‘Souhrn návrhů pro českou justici v oblasti organizace 
soudnictví, civilního a trestního řízení’ [‘A Set of Proposals for the Czech Judiciary the Area of 
organization of the Judiciary and Civil and Criminal Procedure’], Twinning Project CZ 01/IB/JH/01 Judicial 
Reform and Court Management Czech Republic – Germany – United Kingdom.  
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adjudication or that it would entail ‘proper judicial law-making’, as Kühn suggests 
(p. 219), although I agree that the power of the Minister of Justice to seek such 
interpretative statements can be quite problematic. Abstract law making by courts, 
however, is quite common in both continental Europe (think of different abstract 
procedures before constitutional courts or the preliminary ruling procedure before 
the ECJ) and Anglo-American law (here one can refer to the debate on the ‘the 
rise of unnecessary constitutional rulings’ and ‘formulaic constitution’).34 Some 
scholars ‘in the West’ even found the judicial interpretational statements quite 
attractive, corresponding to their conceptualization of judicial law making and 
precedent, which builds on centuries-long experience with that type of law in 
Europe, called ‘legislative precedent.35 
‘Western law’ is presented as a unitary block and then imposed on post-
communist legal culture as a norm. This is quite obvious when Kühn for example 
notes that the continuing denial of the binding force of precedent ‘would not, in 
itself, be tragic because such a view is not uncommon even in western Europe’ (p. 
217). So ‘ignorant’ socialist (and post-communist) lawyers are allowed to have 
some outdated opinions, since we can find them in the West too – but only to an 
extent, since they ‘are increasingly criticized as not being sophisticated enough’ (p. 
217). The West is the measure of everything. 
 
 
  
ON ‘MISSIONARIES, CONVERTS, AND “LOCAL SAVAGES”’  
 
This is perhaps the most troubling feature of the book, together with its 
confrontational style. The author acts as a ‘missionary’ bringing the light of the 
West to the ‘local savages’ in post-communist Europe.36 This style was quite 
effective in implementing reforms western-style when post-communist countries 
wanted to catch up with the West in order to get ‘back to Europe’. It also very 
quickly bolstered those who were able to use it a powerful voice in the struggle for 
reform.  
Those reforms were certainly needed, and Kühn is quite right when he 
identifies numerous problems of the post-communist judiciary. The problem with 
Kühn’s prescriptions and the way he presents them is that the one-sided 
presentation of the West picks up just that part of the western reality which is 
suitable for the one using it and prevents any real discussion. It is simply not ‘cool’ 
to question the law making power of courts, the basic tenets of ‘new 
constitutionalism’, such as the widespread use of the proportionality argument and 
                                                     
34 See Thomas Healy, ‘The Rise of Unnecessary Constitutional Rulings’ (2005) 83 North Carolina Law 
Review 847 and Robert Nagel, ‘Formulaic Constitution’, (1985) 84 Michigan Law Review 165.  
35 See particularly Fréderic Zénati, La jurisprudence (Paris: Dalloz 2001), 214. On the legislative model of 
reasoning with previous decisions see Komárek, n 23.  
36 See András Sajó, ‘Universal Rights, Missionaries, Converts, and “Local Savages”’ (1997) 6 East European 
Constitutional Review 44. 
                         10/2014 
 
 16
less and less weigh being given to legal texts at the expense of free-standing 
evaluations of law’s purposes. While these things are debated in the West and are 
far from settled, in Central Europe much of the debate is muted precisely because 
a one-sided view of the West is used as an authority to tame ‘local savages’ 
expressing doubts.  
When some authors in the East identify such debates and problems, their 
findings are devaluated by Kühn. When for example the Soviet legal theorist 
Vladimir Tumanov criticizes the rise of judge-made law in a book published in 
1974, Kühn mentions ‘a sophisticated leftist view’ presented by Ron Hirschl and 
says: ‘basic ideas are similar, although Hirschl’s claims are much more persuasive 
than those which Tumanov made in dogmatic communist language’ (p. 140, fn. 
301). No matter that Hirschl’s book was published thirty years later, no matter that 
Tumanov’s book is explicitly entitled Contemporary Bourgeois Legal Thought: A Marxist 
Evaluation of the Basic Concepts and thus formulated in the language of the Marxist 
analysis, which Kühn seems not to take seriously throughout the book.37  
Similarly, when a ‘sophisticated socialist author’s’ critique of the same 
phenomenon ‘might be supported by contemporary critics’ (p. 139, Kühn refers to 
Unger), ‘it is very different to argue in this way in the atmosphere of doctrinal 
western pluralism, on the one hand, and in a state of a one-party dictatorship, on 
the other’ (p. 139). In other words, no matter how hard you try, you will always 
remain dogmatic, old-fashioned and ignorant (all these adjectives are used by 
Kühn). You can never have a proper voice of your own or be trusted that you 
genuinely believed in your visions grounded in socialism and communism.  
Eörsi’s prescription can be based on naïve belief in the legislator, who 
operates in a society that is internally much more coherent and thus able to 
determine what is in society’s interest,38 but is Dworkin’s idea of ‘law as integrity’, 
justifying the law making power of judges with reference to the shared liberal 
principles, in any way less?39 These critiques (together with a significant part of 
current jurisprudence and political theory, which is far less pessimistic about 
legislators) are never mentioned in Kühn’s sweeping critique of socialist law and 
its scholars.  
This relates to the wider problem of the ‘ideology called transitology’,40 of 
which the book is a good example: unwillingness to take the communist past 
seriously. The Croatian writer Boris Buden recalls the French philosopher Jean-
                                                     
37 Interestingly, some people ‘in the West’ have found Tumanov’s book rather good. See e.g. a book 
review by Toby Terrar, (1981) 26 American Journal of Jurisprudence 228.  
38 In fact, sociologically speaking, it would be hard to deny that the societies in Central Europe during 
communism were much more coherent than those in the West, especially since the late 1970s.  
39 See Andrew Altman, ‘Legal Realism, Critical Legal Studies, and Dworkin’ (1986) 15 Philosophy and Public 
Affairs 205.  
40 Boris Buden, ‘Children of Postcommunism’ (2010) Radical Philosophy No. 159, 18-25, which is the 
English translation of chapter 2 of Buden’s Zone des Übergangs: Vom Ende des Postkommunismus (Frankfurt 
am Main: Suhrkamp 2009).  
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Luc Nancy’s anger over the belief that ‘history is finally finished with Marxism and 
communism’:41 
  
As if thousands of so-called “intellectuals” were simply fools, and especially 
as if millions of others were even more stupid as to have been caught in the 
delirium of the first. Even if we agree that it was a question of error and 
blindness (certainly stupidity and charlatanry are never absent from human 
affairs), such a degree of success must in and of itself raise problems for 
thought.42 
 
This results in presenting Communism as something external, imposed from the 
barbaric East, rather than as something that was genuinely believed in by many 
people after the horrors of the World War. It also exonerates the ‘democrats’ of 
the post-war era, whose contribution to the decline of Central Europe was not 
negligible.43 The missionaries having the ‘right’ vision of law and politics then 
‘struggle’ with the ‘reactionary forces’, rather than engaging them in a common 
project. The words of the former Vice-President of the Czech Constitutional 
Court Eliška Wagnerová, ‘that there were only fifteen people at the Constitutional 
Court fighting the remainder of the professional legal community’ (p. 230) are 
quite indicative of this mode of ‘debate’. In fact it is the same kind of mentality 
these people say they want to overcome: one person knowing the right way, not 
willing to discuss its correctness with others, only fighting them. Some people are 
thus even not considered qualified anymore to contribute to the debate.44  
The book thus provides a powerful testimony to the post-1989 struggles for 
reform. This, in my view, explains the book’s shortcomings. Its ambition was 
primarily to serve as a blueprint for reform, and as such it was immensely 
successful, at least in the Czech Republic.45 It should not be taken as a final 
analysis of Central European legal culture however: that is yet to be written.  
 
                                                     
41 Ibid.  
42 Jean-Luc Nancy (Tracy B. Strong transl.), ‘La Comparution/The Compearance: From the Existence of 
“Communism” to the Community of “Existence”’ (1992) 20 Political Theory 371-398, 376.  
43 See text to n 20.  
44 The editors of a monument volume Michal Bobek, Pavel Molek, Vojtěch Šimíček (eds), Komunistické 
právo v Československu: Kapitoly z dějin bezpráví [Communist Law in Czechoslovakia - Chapters from the 
History of Lawlessness], (Brno: Masarykova Universita 2009) note that they consciously did not include 
authors who were active in academia before 1989, since their generation is ‘unfortunate’ and even ‘lost’. 
They suggest, in essence, that these people are not able to reflect on their past and therefore not invited 
to the debate on it.  
45 The Czech version of the book under review, based on a doctoral (SJD) thesis defended at the 
University of Michigan School of Law in 2006, was first published in Czech translation as early as in 
2005: See Aplikace práva soudcem v éře středoevropského komunismu a transformace: Analýza příčin postkomunistické 
právní krize [Application of Law by the Judge in the Era of Central-European Communism and Transformation: An 
Analysis of Causes of the Post-Communist Legal Crisis] (Prague: CH Beck 2005).  
